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Abstract
A query is said to be secure against inference attacks by a user if there exists no database instance for which the user can
infer the result of the query, using only authorized queries to the user. In this paper, first, the security problem against inference
attacks on object-oriented databases is formalized. The definition of inference attacks is based on equational logic. Secondly, the
security problem is shown to be undecidable, and a decidable sufficient condition for a given query to be secure under a given
schema is proposed. The idea of the sufficient condition is to over-estimate inference attacks using over-estimated results of static
type inference. The third contribution is to propose subclasses of schemas and queries for which the security problem becomes
decidable. Lastly, the decidability of the security problem is shown to be incomparable with the static type inferability, although
the tightness of the over-estimation of the inference attacks is affected in a large degree by that of the static type inference.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Object-oriented database; Database security; Inference attack; Computational complexity
1. Introduction
Nowadays, many people and organizations have a growing interest in data security. For a database system to be
secure, secrecy, integrity, and availability of data must be achieved appropriately with respect to a given security
policy. Since databases are often used as the core of the systems requiring high-level security (e.g., e-business, Web
services, etc.), it is desirable that the verification of the security of databases be possible. Various authorization models
for databases have been proposed and studied so far in order to both represent given security policies in a natural way
and analyze the users’ authorization in a rigorous way. In the context of object-oriented databases (OODBs), the
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“an object can be accessed only via its methods” in the object-oriented paradigm. In the model, an authorization A
for a user u can be represented as a set of rights m(c1, . . . , cn), which means that u can directly invoke method m
on any tuple (o1, . . . , on) of objects such that oi is an object of class ci with 1  i  n. On the other hand, even if
m(c1, . . . , cn) /∈ A, u can invoke m indirectly through another method execution in several models, e.g., protection
mode in [3]. Although such indirect invocations are useful for data hiding [3], they may also allow a violation of
secrecy by inference attacks in some situations.
Example 1. Let Employee, Host, and Room be classes representing employees, hosts, and rooms, respectively. Sup-
pose that a method computer returns the host which a given employee uses, and a method location returns the room in
which a given host is placed. Also suppose that a method office, which returns the room occupied by a given employee,
is implemented as office(x) = location(computer(x)).
Now suppose that the physical network topology is top secret information. In this case, an authorization for a
user u may be the one shown in Fig. 1, where a solid (respectively dotted) arrow denotes an authorized (respectively
unauthorized) method to u. Suppose that u has obtained that computer(John) = mars and office(John) = A626 using
the authorized methods. Also suppose that u knows the implementation body of office as its behavioral specification.
Then, u knows that location(computer(John)) = A626, and therefore, u can infer that location(mars) = A626.
On the other hand, suppose that method computer retrieves top secret information and therefore the authorization
for u is set as shown in Fig. 2. Then, u knows that location(mars) = A626, office(John) = A626, and office(x) =
location(computer(x)), similarly to the former case. However, u cannot conclude that computer(John) = mars only
from the above information, since there may be another host, say neptune, such that computer(John) = neptune and
location(neptune) = A626.
Let S be a database schema and c1, . . . , cn be classes in S. An n-ary query (i.e., a composition of methods)
q(x1, . . . , xn) is said to be secure at (c1, . . . , cn) against inference attacks by u if u cannot infer the result of
q(o1, . . . , on) for any objects oi of class ci in any database instance I of S, using only authorized methods to u.
Otherwise, q(x1, . . . , xn) is insecure. For example, if computer(Employee) and office(Employee) are authorized, then
location(x) is insecure at Host since the user can infer location(mars) = A626 under the database instance shown in
Fig. 1. On the other hand, it will be shown later that computer(x) is secure at Employee when only location(Host)
and office(Employee) are authorized. It is important for database administrators to know which methods are secure
and which ones are not. When an administrator finds that a method which retrieves top secret information is insecure
against inference attacks by u, the administrator can prevent u from attacking the method by changing the authoriza-
tion for u.
Fig. 1. An example of an insecure method.
Fig. 2. An example of a secure method.
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As a formal model of OODB schemas, method schemas [4] are adopted since they support such basic features of
OODBs as method overloading, dynamic binding, and complex objects, although the returned value of a method
execution is limited to a single object. The semantics is simply defined based on term rewriting. Then, user’s inference
based on equational logic is defined on the assumption that all the information available to the user is the execution
results of authorized methods and the implementation bodies of authorized methods. Technically, user’s inference is
also treated in the framework of term rewriting. The execution result of a term can be computed as it is if the user
has authorization to all the methods in the term. Otherwise, there may exist an indirect way to compute the term by
equivalently rewriting it to another term which contains only authorized methods. Our definition of user’s inference
provides the rewriting rules representing such direct/indirect computation and enables us to treat the security against
inference attacks in a simple and rigorous way.
Example 2. Consider the case of Fig. 1 in Example 1 again. Let I denote the database instance shown in Fig. 1. In
this paper, user’s inference based on equational logic is treated in the framework of term rewriting as follows. First,
executing computer(John) and office(John) is authorized to the user u, and u can obtain the execution results under I .
This fact is represented by the following rewriting rules:
computer(John)I mars,
office(John)I A626.
Intuitively, the rule I represents a primitive step of inference by the user. Next, u knows that the implementation
body of office(x) is location(computer(x)). The rewriting rule below represents this fact combined with the fact that
the execution result of office(John) is A626:
location(computer(John))I A626.
Moreover, to simulate the inference based on equational logic, some more rewriting rules (e.g., location(mars) I
A626) are necessary. Then, whether the execution result of a term can be inferred corresponds to whether the term
can be reduced to an object by the rewriting rules I . In this example, the execution result of location(mars) can be
inferred because of the rule location(mars)I A626. A little more complicated example will be given in Example 16
in Section 3.2.
Secondly, the security problem is shown to be undecidable. Also, a decidable sufficient condition for a given
query to be secure under a given schema is proposed. The main idea of the sufficient condition is to “conservatively”
approximate the user’s inference. The user’s inference is object-level inference, while the approximation is class-
level inference. To accomplish the class-level inference, the technique of type inference is used, where type inference
means deriving the classes to which the possible results of the method execution belong. Unfortunately, exact type
inference is impossible in general [4]. However, the type inference algorithm proposed in [5] can compute a set of
classes which contain all the correct classes, although the set may contain some wrong classes. Using this algorithm,
we can conservatively approximate user’s inference.
The third contribution is to propose subclasses of schemas and queries for which the security problem becomes
decidable. We focus on the linearity of schemas and/or queries, which is a popular notion of the field of term rewriting.
A query (i.e., a term with variables) t is linear if no variable in t appears more than once. A schema S is linear if all
the implementation bodies of the methods in S are linear. Then, in the linear case, the security problem is shown to be
decidable. More precisely, the exact type inference of linear queries is possible under linear schemas, and the user’s
inference can be exactly simulated using the result of type inference (i.e., the proposed sufficient condition mentioned
above is also a necessary condition).
The fourth contribution is to investigate the relationship between type inferability and decidability of the security
problem (see also Table 1). The security of type-inferable but non-linear queries is undecidable under linear schemas.
On the other hand, type inference is impossible for queries whose security is decidable under linear schemas. These
results imply that type inferability and decidability of the security problem are incomparable (compare the second
columns of Tables 1(a) and 1(b)).
In this paper we discuss “logical” inference in OODBs in the sense that the result of the inference is always true.
The inference in statistical databases [6] is a kind of logical inference. Reference [7] proposes a mechanism that
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Relationship between type inferability and security decidability
(a) Type inferability
Queries
Schemas Linear Security-decidable Generalbut non-linear
Linear Y (Theorem 29) N (Theorem 37) N
General N [16] N N [4]
(b) Decidability of the security problem
Queries
Schemas Linear Type-inferable Generalbut non-linear
Linear Y (Theorem 30) N (Theorem 36) N
General N (Theorem 21) N N
accomplishes maximum data availability as long as given sensitive information is secure against logical inference.
Reference [8] focuses on logical inference in OODBs. Besides inferability of the result of a method execution, the
article introduces the notion of controllability, which means that a user can control (alter arbitrarily) an attribute-value
of an object in a database instance. We do not consider controllability since our query language does not support
update operations for database instances. However, since our query language supports recursion while the one in [8]
does not, detecting inferability in our formalization is not trivial.
On the other hand, some of the recent researches concentrate on “statistical” inference, i.e., inference with some
statistical assumptions. Reference [9] discusses the inference based on Bayesian methods. In [10], a quantitative
measure of inference risk is formally defined. In [11,12], the security against statistical inference is defined based on
information theory.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the definition of method schemas. In Section 3, we
discuss inference attacks and formulate the security problem. In Section 4, we show that the problem is undecidable,
and propose a sufficient condition for a query to be secure. In Section 5, we show that the problem is decidable in
the linear case. In Section 6, we discuss the relationship between type inferability and security decidability. Finally, in
Section 7, we conclude this paper.
2. The OODB model
We adopt method schemas [4,13] as a formal model of OODBs. Method schemas have such basic features of
OODBs as method overloading, dynamic binding, and complex objects, although the returned value of a method exe-
cution is limited to a single object. The semantics can simply be defined based on term rewriting [14]. In this section,
we first introduce some notations and concepts for term rewriting. Then, by using those notations and concepts, we
restate the original definition of method schemas.
2.1. Notations
Let F be a family of disjoint sets F0, F1, F2, . . . , where, for a nonnegative integer n, Fn is a set of function symbols
of arity n. For a countable set X of variables, let TF (X) denote the set of all the terms freely generated by F and X.
A term t ∈ TM(X) is linear if every variable in X appears in t at most once.
For a set U , let Un denote the Cartesian product U × · · · ×U︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
. Hereafter, we often use a bold letter u to mean
(u1, . . . , un) without explicitly mentioning it when n is irrelevant or obvious from the context. Also, we write u ∈ u if
u = ui for some i.
Define the set Pos(t) of positions of a term t as the smallest set of sequences of positive integers with the following
two properties:
• The empty sequence ε is in Pos(t).
• For each 1 i  n, if r ∈ Pos(ti), then i · r ∈ Pos(f (t1, . . . , tn)), where the center dot “·” represents the concate-
nation of sequences.
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The subterm of t at position r is denoted t/r . The replacement in t with t ′ at position r , denoted t[r ← t ′], is defined
as follows:
• t[ε ← t ′] = t ′;
• f (t1, . . . , ti , . . . , tn)[i · r ← t ′] = f (t1, . . . , ti−1, ti[r ← t ′], ti+1, . . . , tn).
Let V (t) denote the set of positions r of t such that t/r ∈ X. That is, V (t) is the positions of variables of t , and hence,
V (t) ⊆ Pos(t). Let σ : V (t) → TF (X) be a substitution mapping, i.e., a mapping such that if t/r = t/r ′, where r ,
r ′ ∈ V (t), then σ(r) = σ(r ′). For a term t ∈ TF (X), let tσ denote the term obtained from t by replacing each variable
t/r with σ(r). Also, let t[t/x] denote tσ , where σ is a substitution mapping such that σ(ri) = ti with t/ri = xi for
each ri ∈ V (t). For example, f (x1, g(x1, x2))[(f (a), x1)/(x1, x2)] = f (f (a), g(f (a), x1)).
2.2. Database schemas
Let C be a finite set of class names (or simply classes). Let M be a family of mutually disjoint finite sets
M0,M1,M2, . . . , where, for a nonnegative integer n, Mn is a set of function symbols (or often called method names)
of arity n. Each Mn is partitioned into Mb,n and Mc,n. Let Mb =⋃n0 Mb,n and Mc =⋃n0 Mc,n. Each mb ∈ Mb
(respectively mc ∈ Mc) is called a base method name (respectively composite method name). We say that M is a
method signature.
Definition 3 (Method definition). Let c ∈ Cn. A base method definition of mb ∈ Mb,n at c is a pair (mb(c), c) for some
c ∈ C. A composite method definition of mc ∈ Mc,n at c is a pair (mc(c), t) for some t ∈ TM({x1, . . . , xn}).
For 1 i  n, let oi be an object of class ci (see Definition 8 for the formal definition of objects). Informally, the
above base method definition declares that the application of mb to o = (o1, . . . , on) results in an object of c or its
subclass, while the above composite method definition states that the application of mc to o results in term rewriting
starting from t[o/x].
Definition 4 (Method schema). (See [4,13].) A method schema S is a 5-tuple (C,,M,Σb,Σc), where:
(1) C is a finite set of class names,
(2)  is a partial order on C representing a class hierarchy,
(3) M is a method signature,
(4) Σb is a set of base method definitions, and
(5) Σc is a set of composite method definitions.
For every combination c ∈ Cn and m ∈ Mn, there must exist at most one method definition of m at c.
When c′  c, we say that c′ is a subclass of c and c is a superclass of c′. We naturally extend  to n-tuples of
classes as follows: For two tuples c = (c1, . . . , cn) and c′ = (c′1, . . . , c′n), we write c c′ iff ci  c′i for all i.
Example 5. An example of a method schema S1 is shown in Fig. 3. Manager is a subclass of Employee, and Server
is a subclass of Host. Method boss(e) returns the direct boss of employee e, and method supervisor(e) returns the
“second least manager” among the indirect bosses of e.
2.3. Inheritance
Let c ∈ Cn and m ∈ Mn. By Definition 4, the method definition of m at c may not exist. In this case, the definition
of m at the smallest superclass of c is “inherited” by c. The inherited method definition is called resolution and defined
as follows:
Definition 6 (Resolution). Let S = (C,,M,Σb,Σc), mb ∈ Mb,n, and c ∈ Cn. Suppose that (mb(c′), c′) ∈ Σb is the
base method definition of mb at the smallest c′ above c, i.e., whenever (mb(c′′), c′′) ∈ Σb and c c′′, it is the case that
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Manager Employee, Server Host
M = {boss, computer, location, supervisor,office}
Σb = {(boss(Employee),Employee),
(boss(Manager),Manager),
(computer(Employee),Host),
(location(Host),Room)}
Σc = {(supervisor(Employee), supervisor(boss(x1))),
(supervisor(Manager),boss(x1)),
(office(Employee), location(computer(x1)))}
Fig. 3. A method schema S1.
c′  c′′. The resolution Res(mb(c)) of mb at c is defined as c′. If such a unique base method definition does not exist,
then Res(mb(c)) is undefined, denoted ⊥.
The resolution of a composite method is defined in the same way. Suppose that (mc(c′), t ′) ∈ Σc is the composite
method definition of mc at the smallest c′ above c. Then, Res(mc(c)) is defined as t ′. If such a unique composite
method definition does not exist, then Res(mc(c)) is undefined, denoted ⊥.
Example 7. Consider schema S1 shown in Fig. 3. By Definition 6, Res(location(Server)) = Room. In other words,
class Server inherits method definition (location(Host),Room) ∈ Σb. On the other hand, Res(boss(Server)) = ⊥ since
no superclass of Server has a definition of boss.
2.4. Database instance
A database instance of a method schema assigns a set of objects to each class name. Also, it gives the semantics of
base methods.
Definition 8 (Database instance). A database instance of a method schema S is a pair I = (ν,μ) with the following
properties:
(1) To each c ∈ C, ν assigns a finite disjoint set ν(c) of object identifiers (or simply, objects). Each o ∈ ν(c) is called
an object of class c. Let OI =⋃c∈C ν(c). For c = (c1, . . . , cn), let ν(c) denote ν(c1) × · · · × ν(cn).
(2) For each mb ∈ Mb,n, μ(mb) is a partial mapping from OnI to OI which satisfies the following two conditions.
Let c, c′ ∈ Cn.
(a) If Res(mb(c)) = c′, then μ(mb)|ν(c) is a total mapping to ⋃cc′ ν(c), where “|” denotes that the domain
of μ(mb) is restricted to ν(c).
(b) If Res(mb(c)) = ⊥, then μ(mb) is undefined everywhere in ν(c).
If μ(m)(o) is undefined, then we write μ(m)(o) = ⊥.
In the above definition, ν(c)’s are defined to be disjoint. This definition can be easily modified so that ν(c) ⊆ ν(c′)
for any c and c′ such that c  c′. However, as discussed later, we are often interested in the most specific (smallest)
class of a given object. Hence, it is preferable that ν(c)’s are defined to be disjoint.
2.5. Method execution
A term in TM(OI ) is called an instantiated term. That is, an instantiated term consists of method names in M
and objects in OI . The one-step execution relation →I on the instantiated terms, based on the innermost reduction
strategy, is defined as follows:
Definition 9 (Method execution). For a term t ∈ TM(OI ), let m(o) (o ∈ ν(c)) be a subterm of t at position r .
(1) If m ∈ Mb and μ(m)(o) 	= ⊥, then t →I t[r ← μ(m)(o)].
(2) If m ∈ Mc and Res(m(c)) = t ′ 	= ⊥, then t →I t[r ← t ′[o/x]].
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Note that taking the innermost reduction strategy (i.e., rewriting only the term in the form of m(o)) is essential
since the definition of m cannot be bound before knowing the classes of the arguments of m.
Let →∗I be the reflexive and transitive closure of →I . The execution result of t , denoted t↓I , is a term t ′ such that
t →∗I t ′ and there exists no t ′′ such that t ′ →I t ′′. Since →I has Church–Rosser property [14], the execution result
is uniquely determined. If t↓I ∈ OI , then the execution of t is successful, and if t↓I /∈ OI , then the execution of t is
aborted. In both cases (i.e., if t↓I exists), the execution of t is terminating. On the other hand, if t↓I does not exist,
then the execution of t is nonterminating. We omit the subscript I of →I , →∗I , and ↓I if I is irrelevant or obvious
from the context.
Example 10. An example of a database instance I1 = (ν1,μ1) of S1 is shown in Fig. 4. ν1 is represented by
gray rectangles, e.g., ν1(Employee) = {Alice, John}. μ1 is represented by arrows, e.g., μ1(boss)(John) = Alice,
μ1(computer)(John) = mars. By Definition 9, supervisor(Alice) is executed as follows:
supervisor(Alice) →I1 supervisor(boss(Alice))
→I1 supervisor(Sara)
→I1 boss(Sara)
→I1 Bob.
Thus supervisor(Alice)↓I1 = Bob.
3. The security problem
3.1. Authorization
Various sophisticated method-based authorization models for OODBs have been proposed [1,2]. In this paper,
however, discussing authorization models is not our main purpose, and therefore we adopt the following simple but
general method-based authorization model.
Definition 11 (Authorization). Let S = (C,,M,Σb,Σc). A right is a term in the form of m(c), where m ∈ Mn
and c ∈ Cn. An authorization A is a finite set of rights and is interpreted as follows. Suppose that a user requests to
directly invoke a method m on a tuple o of objects. Let c be the tuple of the classes such that o ∈ ν(c). If m(c) ∈ A,
then the invocation is permitted. Otherwise, it is prohibited.
An authorization is often modeled as a pair of a base authorization and a set of inference rules. An example of an
inference rule is “if u is authorized to invoke m on objects of c, then u is also authorized to invoke m on objects of
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this rule. In this paper, we assume that a given authorization has already been expanded.
Example 12. Define an authorization A1 for a user u under S1 in Fig. 3 as follows:
A1 =
{
computer(Employee),
supervisor(Employee), supervisor(Manager),
office(Employee), office(Manager)
}
.
Consider the instance I1 in Fig. 4. Executing office(John) by u is permitted since John ∈ ν1(Employee) and
office(Employee) ∈ A1. On the other hand, executing computer(Sara) is prohibited since Sara ∈ ν1(Manager) but
computer(Manager) /∈ A1.
3.2. Inference attacks and the security problem
In this section, we formalize inference attacks (Definition 15). We generally assume that user’s knowledge is
modeled as a set of (in)equalities (Section 3.2.1). For example, suppose that a user u executes office(John) and obtains
the result A626. The information that u obtains is office(John)↓ = A626. Then, we restrict the power of the user’s
inference in a reasonable way and demonstrate that user’s inference is modeled as equational reasoning (Section 3.2.2).
Section 3.2.3 states formal definitions. In Definition 15, how to perform equational reasoning is defined as term
rewriting rules. Then, in Definition 17, we define the security problem. Let τ be a term representing the query to be
attacked. This term can be computed as it is if the user has authorization to all its methods. Even if the user does not
have authorization to some methods in τ , there may exist an indirect way to compute τ by equivalently rewriting τ to
another term involving only authorized methods. The term rewriting rules defined in Definition 15 are the rules that
represent how to compute terms in a direct and/or indirect way. Thus, if τ cannot be rewritten into an object by the
rewriting rules, τ is said to be secure.
3.2.1. General attacker model
First of all, we define the equalities which u can obtain directly from the execution results of authorized methods
and their resolutions (Definition 6) as follows:
(∗1) User u knows m(o)↓ = o iff m(c) ∈ A, o ∈ ν(c), and m(o)↓ = o ∈ OI . That is, u knows what the result of m(o)
is if executing m(o) is authorized and the execution is successful.
(∗2) User u knows Res(m(c)) = t iff m(c) ∈ A and Res(m(c)) = t . That is, u knows the type declaration of m at c
(when m is a base method) or the behavioral specification of m at c (when m is a composite method), if executing
m(o) (o ∈ ν(c)) is authorized.
In Example 1, (∗1) and (∗2) are stated informally. Also suppose that user u knows that o 	= o′ for distinct objects
o and o′ (e.g., u knows John 	= Alice, Sara 	= A626, and so on). Then, to infer new knowledge, u can use at least
four inference rules on equalities: reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and substitutivity (i.e., if ti = t ′i for all i, then
f (t) = f (t′)).
3.2.2. Assumptions on the attacker model
To make the attacker model theoretically simple, we would like to assume the following two conditions:
(Q1) User u can use no inference rules other than reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and substitutivity. In other words,
the user’s knowledge is the congruence closure of the direct knowledge (∗1) and (∗2).
(Q2) The knowledge of u is represented by a set of ground equalities (i.e., equalities without variables).
In what follows, we demonstrate that assuming these conditions is reasonable.
(Q1) mentions the inference power of the user. We must exclude at least trivial cases where the user can use other
inference rules. Let us examine one trivial case illustrated in the following example:
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be another host h such that computer(John)↓ = h and location(h)↓ = A626. However, if u knows that location(o)↓ 	=
A626 for any other object o in the database instance, then u can conclude that computer(John) = mars.
In this example, u uses an inference rule such that an equality is inferred from the contents of OI and a set of
inequalities. However, such inference becomes impossible if u does not know what OI is. Practically, just hiding OI
from the user is sufficient for making the inference using inequalities impossible.
(Q2) requires that non-ground equalities obtained by (∗2) can be translated into equivalent ground equalities. The
following example suggests when such translation is possible.
Example 14. Consider a schema with a composite method mc which has the same resolution t at every class c ∈ C.
Let A = {mc(c) | c ∈ C} be an authorization for a user u.
Assume that u knows what C is. Then, u can infer that mc(t ′)↓ = t[t ′/x]↓ for any term t ′ (no matter whether
t ′↓ ∈ OI or not), since mc has the same resolution t at any class. Note that, in this inference, u does not need to know
which class t ′↓ belongs to. In other words, u can substitute any term to the variable x in mc(x)↓ = t↓.
On the other hand, if u does not know what C is, then u cannot conclude that mc(t ′)↓ = t[t ′/x]↓ without exactly
inferring the class to which t ′↓ belongs (or inferring that the execution of t ′ is aborted) since there may be another
class c in C such that t ′↓ ∈ ν(c) and Res(mc(c)) 	= t . However, since type inference [4,5] is useless when u does
not know what C is, to know the class to which t ′↓ belongs is to infer the exact value of t ′↓. Consequently, u can
substitute only an object of class c to the variable x in mc(x)↓ = t↓.
Thus, when C is hidden from u, each equality Res(mc(c)) = t obtained by (∗2) can be translated into {mc(o)↓ =
t[o/x]↓ | o ∈ ν(c)}, which is a finite set of ground equalities.
In summary, assuming (Q1) and (Q2) is practically reasonable. This means that user’s inference can be defined as
the congruence closure (by (Q1)) of a finite set of ground equalities (by (Q2)) induced by (∗1) and (∗2). For technical
reasons, we define the congruence closure through rewriting rules I,A introduced below. From the correctness of
Knuth–Bendix completion [14], t↓ = o iff t is reducible to o by I,A.
3.2.3. Formal definitions
Now, we provide formal definitions of inference attacks and the security problem.
Definition 15 (Inference attacks). Define PI,A as the minimum set of rewriting rules I,A on TM(OI ) satisfying the
following three conditions. Intuitively, t I,A o means that the user knows or can infer that t↓ = o.
(A) If m(c) ∈ A, o ∈ ν(c), and m(o)↓ = o ∈ OI , then PI,A contains
m(o)I,A o.
This corresponds to (∗1).
(B) If mc(c) ∈ A, mc ∈ Mc, o ∈ ν(c), mc(o)↓ = o ∈ OI , and Res(mc(c)) = t 	= ⊥, then PI,A contains
t[o/x]I,A o.
This essentially corresponds to (∗2).
(C) If PI,A contains t I,A o and t ′′ I,A o′′ such that t ′′ is a proper subterm of t at r ′′, then PI,A contains
t[r ′′ ← o′′]I,A o.
This simulates Knuth–Bendix completion procedure and, roughly speaking, corresponds to symmetry.
By definition, the right-hand side of each rule is an object. Note that the existence of t I,A o in PI,A implies t →∗I o.
Define ⇒I,A as the one-step reduction relation by I,A. That is, t ⇒I,A t ′ iff there exists a subterm t ′′ of t at r ′′
such that t ′′I,A o′′ ∈ PI,A and t ′ = t[r ′′ ← o′′] (this corresponds to substitutivity). Let ⇒∗I,A denote the reflexive and
transitive closure of ⇒I,A (this corresponds to reflexivity and transitivity). For readability, we often write I and PI
instead of I,A and PI,A, respectively.
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computer(Alice) I1 jupiter (A2)
supervisor(John) I1 Bob (A3)
supervisor(Alice) I1 Bob (A4)
supervisor(Sara) I1 Bob (A5)
supervisor(Bob) I1 Bob (A6)
office(John) I1 A626 (A7)
office(Alice) I1 B533 (A8)
office(Sara) I1 A626 (A9)
office(Bob) I1 B533 (A10)
supervisor(boss(John)) I1 Bob (B1)
supervisor(boss(Alice)) I1 Bob (B2)
boss(Sara) I1 Bob (B3)
boss(Bob) I1 Bob (B4)
location(computer(John)) I1 A626 (B5)
location(computer(Alice)) I1 B533 (B6)
location(computer(Sara)) I1 A626 (B7)
location(computer(Bob)) I1 B533 (B8)
location(mars) I1 A626 (C1)
location(jupiter) I1 B533 (C2)
Fig. 5. Contents of PI1,A1 .
Example 16. For S1 in Fig. 3, I1 in Fig. 4, and A1 in Example 12, PI1,A1 is computed as shown in Fig. 5. Rules
(A1)–(A10) are obtained by Definition 15(A), and (B1)–(B8) by Definition 15(B) with composite methods supervisor
and office. Rules (C1) and (C2) are obtained by Definition 15(C). For example, (C1) is derived from (A1) and (B5).
Rule (C1) indicates that the user can infer that location(mars)↓ = A626, as stated in the first case of Example 1.
Moreover, rule (C2) indicates that location even for a server jupiter can be inferred. Let τ = office(boss(Sara)) and
τ ′ = office(boss(John)). Then,
τ ⇒I1 office(Bob) ⇒I1 B533.
Thus user u can infer that τ↓ = B533. On the other hand, u cannot infer the value of τ ′↓ (although τ ′↓ = B533) since
no subterm of τ ′ can be rewritten by the rules in PI1,A1 .
Definition 17 (The security problem). A term τ ∈ TM(X) is said to be secure at a tuple c of classes under a schema S
and an authorization A if there exists no instance I = (ν,μ) of S such that τ [o/x] ⇒∗I,A o for any o ∈ ν(c) and o ∈ OI .
Otherwise, τ is insecure at c under S and A. The security problem is to determine whether a given τ is secure at a
given c under given S and A.
4. General case
4.1. Undecidability of the security problem for general schemas
We show that the security problem is undecidable by reducing the Modified Post’s Correspondence Problem
(MPCP) [15] to the security problem. The reduction strategy was obtained by modifying that of the proof of the
undecidability of the type-consistency problem [16].
Let (w,u) be an instance of the MPCP over alphabet Σ = {0,1}, where w = (w1, . . . ,wn), u = (u1, . . . , un), and
wi,ui ∈ Σ∗. A solution of (w,u) is a finite sequence (i1, i2, . . . , ik) of indices such that wi1wi2 · · ·wik = ui1ui2 · · ·uik
and i1 = 1. In what follows, we construct a schema Sw,u, a term τ , and an authorization A such that (w,u) has a
solution iff there exists a database instance I of Sw,u under which the execution result of τ can be inferred.
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Each ci (1 i  n) represents the index i of w and u. c′0 and c′1 represent symbols 0 and 1 in Σ , respectively. Classes
c and cok represent the “separators” and “end markers” in database instances, respectively, as explained in the example
below. Class cdummy represents dummy execution results.
Sw,u has unary base methods next and dummy, unary composite methods isw, iswi,j , isu, and isui,j , and a binary
base method post. Their method definitions are constructed from (w,u) as follows. First, the definition of method
next is:
(next(ci), c) for each 1 i  n,
(next(c), cok),
(next(c′0), cok),
(next(c′1), cok).
A pair of a database instance (more precisely, the semantics of next) and an object of class c1 is regarded to represent
two things, a candidate (i1, . . . , ik) for a solution of (w,u) and a string s over Σ , as illustrated in the following
example.
Example 18. Consider the following instance (w,u) of the MPCP:
w1 = 101, u1 = 1,
w2 = 00, u2 = 100,
w3 = 11, u3 = 011.
A typical database instance I2 of Sw,u is shown in Fig. 6. In the figure, method next is represented by arrows. Pair
(I2, o1) represents the following candidate and string. First, the candidate is represented by the sequence of objects
from o1 to the “separator” object o of class c (the upper half of the figure). In the figure, the objects are of classes c1,
c3, and c2, so the candidate is (1,3,2). On the other hand, the string is represented by the sequence of objects between
the “end marker” object ook of class cok and o (the lower half of the figure). In the figure, the objects are of classes c′1,
c′0, c′1, c′1, c′1, c′0, and c′0 (in the reverse order with respect to next), so the represented string is 1011100.
On the other hand, pair (I ′2, o′1) shown in Fig. 7 represents no candidates since no object of class c is “reachable”
from o′1 under I ′2.
Fig. 6. An example of a database instance I2 of Sw,u.
Fig. 7. Another database instance I ′2 of Sw,u.
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infinite string if no “end marker” object of class cok is reachable from the “separator” object o). To check whether
the candidate is actually a solution, we examine whether both wi1 · · ·wik = s and ui1 · · ·uik = s. Unary composite
methods isw and isu are used for that purpose. Let wi = wi,1wi,2 · · ·wi,di for each i (1 i  n), where wi,j ∈ Σ . The
definitions of method isw and its auxiliary composite methods iswi,j are constructed as follows:
(isw(ci), iswi,1(· · · iswi,di (isw(next(x))))),
(isw(c),next(x)),
(iswi,j (c′0),next(x)) if wi,j = 0,
(iswi,j (c′1),next(x)) if wi,j = 1,
(iswi,j (cok),dummy(x)),
(iswi,j (cdummy), x),
where unary base method dummy is defined so that it always returns an object of class cdummy. If wi1 · · ·wik = s, then
isw(o1) returns an object of class cok. Otherwise, isw(o1) returns an object of a class other than cok. Note that if (I, o1)
represents no candidate as is the case of Fig. 7, then the execution of isw(o1) is nonterminating under I . Method isu
is defined in the same way.
Example 19. For the instance (w,u) of the MPCP in Example 18, method isw and its auxiliary methods are defined
as follows:
(isw(c1), isw1,1(isw1,2(isw1,3(isw(next(x)))))),
(isw(c2), isw2,1(isw2,2(isw(next(x))))),
(isw(c3), isw3,1(isw3,2(isw(next(x))))),
(isw(c),next(x)),
(isw1,1(c′1),next(x)), (isw1,2(c′0),next(x)), (isw1,3(c′1),next(x)),
(isw2,1(c′0),next(x)), (isw2,2(c′0),next(x)),
(isw3,1(c′1),next(x)), (isw3,2(c′1),next(x)),
(iswi,j (cok),dummy(x)) for any pair (i, j),
(iswi,j (cdummy), x) for any pair (i, j).
The execution of isw(o1) under I2 in Fig. 6 is as follows:
isw(o1) →∗I2 isw1,1(isw1,2(isw1,3(isw3,1(isw3,2(isw2,1(isw2,2(isw(o))))))))
→∗I2 ook.
Lastly, binary base method post is defined so that it always returns an object of class cdummy regardless of its
arguments.
Define authorization A as
A = {post(cok, cok), isw(c1), isu(c1)}.
Let τ = post(isw(x), isu(x)).
Lemma 20. τ is insecure at c1 iff (w,u) has a solution.
Proof. Only if part. τ involves method post. Since methods isw and isu never invokes post, in order for the user to
know the execution result of τ , the user must invoke method post directly. By the definition of A, only post(cok, cok) is
authorized. Therefore, if τ is insecure at c1, there must be a pair (I, o1) such that the execution results of both isw(o1)
and isu(o1) are objects of class cok. Such (I, o1) represents a solution of (w,u).
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isw(o1) and isu(o1) are objects of class cok. Therefore, the user can simply execute τ [o1/x] and obtain the execution
result. That is, τ is insecure at c1. 
Thus, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 21. The security problem is undecidable.
Note that the undecidability holds even if the “height” of the class hierarchy is one. On the other hand, in our
conjecture, the security problem is decidable if the “height” of the class hierarchy is zero. The proof will be similar
to the one of Theorem 1 in [16], which shows the decidability of the type-consistency problem for schemas with the
height of the class hierarchy zero.
4.2. A decidable sufficient condition for the security
In this section we propose a decidable sufficient condition for a given term τ ∈ TM(X) to be secure at c. The main
idea is to use classes instead of objects for analyzing the security. To do so, we introduce new rewriting rules on
TM(C) which “conservatively” approximate I,A, i.e., if τ is insecure at c, then τ [c/x] is reducible to a class c by
the new rewriting rules. Intuitively, each t[c/x] ∈ TM(C) is considered as the set of instantiated terms t[o/x] such
that o ∈ ν(c). In order to compute the “execution result” of t[c/x], the result ES of type inference would be useful,
where ES is defined as follows: c ∈ ES(t, c) iff there is a database instance I = (ν,μ) of S such that t[o/x]↓I ∈ ν(c)
for some o ∈ ν(c).
In what follows, we first summarize the known results on type inference for method schemas. Next, new rewriting
rules for conservatively approximating inference attacks are introduced. Then, a sufficient condition for the security
is proposed (Theorem 25) and its correctness and complexity are discussed.
4.2.1. Known results on type inference
Unfortunately, ES is uncomputable in general [4]. However, it is possible to compute an over-estimation
Z :TM(C) → 2C of ES , that is, Z(t[c/x]) ⊇ ES(t, c) for every pair of t and c. The algorithm in [5] gives an over-
estimation of ES by computing the least fixpoint of Zˆ satisfying the following four kinds of equations:
• For each c ∈ C, Zˆ(c) = {c};
• For each pair (mb(c), c′) such that Res(mb(c)) = c′, Zˆ(mb(c)) = {c | c c′};
• For each pair (mc(c), t) such that Res(mc(c)) = t , Zˆ(mc(c)) = Zˆ(t[c/x]);
• For every term m(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ TM(X) and any tuples c1, . . . , cn of classes,
Zˆ
(
m
(
t1[c1/x1], . . . , tn[cn/xn]
))= ⋃
c′∈Zˆ(t1[c1/x1])×···×Zˆ(tn[cn/xn])
Zˆ
(
m(c′)
)
.
Let Z be the least fixpoint of Zˆ. Also let t be an arbitrary term in TM(X). It is guaranteed in [5] that Z(t[c/x]) ⊇
ES(t, c). Moreover, if S contains only unary methods, then Z is identical with ES .
Example 22. Using the algorithm in [5], we can compute Z for schema S1 in Fig. 3. The result is presented in
Fig. 8. For example, Z(boss(Employee)) = {Employee,Manager} means that for any object e of Employee, the result
of boss(e) is an object of either Employee or Manager. Actually, the obtained Z is equal to ES1 since S1 contains only
unary methods.
4.2.2. Conservative approximation of inference attacks
In order to approximate inference attacks, we use an over-estimation Z of ES since ES is uncomputable. The
smaller Z(t[c/x]) is, the better approximation we have, although the approximation is still conservative even when
Z(t[c/x]) = C for every pair of t and c. In the next definition, the class-level inference, which approximates the
object-level inference I,A, is defined as inference rules S,A,Z on TM(C). The definition is similar to the definition
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Z(boss(Manager)) = {Manager}
Z(computer(Employee)) = {Host,Server}
Z(computer(Manager)) = {Host,Server}
Z(location(Host)) = {Room}
Z(location(Server)) = {Room}
Z(supervisor(Employee)) = {Manager}
Z(supervisor(Manager)) = {Manager}
Z(office(Employee)) = {Room}
Z(office(Manager)) = {Room}
Z(m(c)) = ∅ for any other pairs of m and c
Z(m(t)) =
⋃
c∈Z(t)
Z(m(c))
Fig. 8. Z for schema S1.
of I,A (Definition 15) except that the objects are replaced with the possible classes indicated by Z. Since Z is
an over-estimation of ES , all the object-level inference is captured by the corresponding class-level inference (see
Theorem 25 below for formal discussion), but the converse is not necessarily true.
Definition 23 (Approximation of inference attacks). Define PS,A,Z as the minimum set of rewriting rules S,A,Z on
TM(C) satisfying the following three conditions:
(A) If m(c) ∈ A, then PS,A,Z contains
m(c)S,A,Z c
for each c ∈ Z(m(c)).
(B) If mc(c) ∈ A, mc ∈ Mc, and Res(mc(c)) = t 	= ⊥, then PS,A,Z contains
t[c/x]S,A,Z c
for each c ∈ Z(t[c/x]).
(C) If PS contains t S,A,Z c and t ′′ S,A,Z c′′ such that t ′′ is a proper subterm of t at r ′′, then PS,A,Z contains
t[r ′′ ← c′′]S,A,Z c′
for each c′ ∈ Z(t[r ′′ ← c′′]).
Define ⇒S,A,Z as the one-step reduction relation by S,A,Z . Let ⇒∗S,A,Z denote the reflexive and transitive closure
of ⇒S,A,Z . For readability, we often write S and PS instead of S,A,Z and PS,A,Z , respectively.
Example 24. Figure 9 presents the contents of PS1,A1,Z for schema S1 in Fig. 3, A1 in Example 12, and Z in Fig. 8.
Rules (Ai)–(Avi) are obtained by Definition 23(A), and (Bi)–(Biv) by Definition 23(B) with composite methods
supervisor and office. Rules (Ci) and (Cii) are obtained by Definition 23(C).
Rule (Cii) indicates that the user may be able to infer the location of a server. Moreover, rules (Avi) and (Bii) to-
gether indicate that the user may be able to infer the office of the boss of a manager. Compare this with the explanation
in Example 16.
Next, consider a looser estimation Z′, which is identical to Z except that
Z′(supervisor(Employee)) = {Employee,Manager}.
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computer(Employee)S1 Server (Aii)
supervisor(Employee)S1 Manager (Aiii)
supervisor(Manager)S1 Manager (Aiv)
office(Employee)S1 Room (Av)
office(Manager)S1 Room (Avi)
supervisor(boss(Employee))S1 Manager (Bi)
boss(Manager)S1 Manager (Bii)
location(computer(Employee))S1 Room (Biii)
location(computer(Manager))S1 Room (Biv)
location(Host)S1 Room (Ci)
location(Server)S1 Room (Cii)
Fig. 9. Contents of PS1,A1,Z .
Then, PS1,A1,Z′ contains the following two rules as well as all the rules in PS1,A1,Z :
supervisor(Employee)S1 Employee, (Aiii′)
supervisor(boss(Employee))S1 Employee. (Bi′)
Rules (Aiii′) and (Ai) together indicate that the user may be able to infer the computer of the supervisor of an
employee. However, it is impossible to do so because the supervisor of an employee is always a manager and
computer(Manager) is unauthorized by A1. In this sense, PS1,A1,Z′ is a worse approximation than PS1,A1,Z .
4.2.3. The proposed sufficient condition
The proposed sufficient condition for the security is stated as the following theorem:
Theorem 25. Let τ ∈ TM(X). If there exists no class c such that τ [c/x] ⇒∗S,A,Z c, then τ is secure at c, i.e., there
exists no instance I = (ν,μ) such that τ [o/x] ⇒∗I,A o for any o ∈ ν(c) and o ∈ OI .
An overview of the correctness of the proposed sufficient condition is illustrated in Fig. 10. We first prove that each
rule in PI is conservatively approximated by a rule in PS .
Lemma 26. If there is an instance I = (ν,μ) such that t[o/x] I o ∈ PI for some o ∈ ν(c) and o ∈ ν(c), then
t[c/x]S c ∈ PS .
Proof. We use induction on the structure of the definition of I (see Definition 15).
Basis. Consider the case that m(o)I o (o ∈ ν(c)) is obtained from Definition 15(A). Then, m(c) ∈ A, o ∈ ν(c),
and m(o)↓ = o. Moreover, c ∈ Z(m(c)) from the property of Z. From Definition 23(A), PS contains m(c)S c since
m(c) ∈ A and c ∈ Z(m(c)). The case that Res(mc(c))[o/x]I o is obtained from Definition 15(B) can be treated in
the same way.
Induction. Suppose that t ′′[o′′/x′′] (o′′ ∈ ν(c′′)) is a proper subterm of t[o/x] (o ∈ ν(c)) at r ′′ and that t[o/x]I o
(o ∈ ν(c)) and t ′′[o′′/x′′] I o′′ (o′′ ∈ ν(c′′)) have been obtained. Let t ′[o′/x′] = t[o/x][r ′′ ← o′′] (o′ ∈ ν(c′)), and
suppose that t ′[o′/x′]I o is obtained from Definition 15(C). By the inductive hypothesis, PS contains both t[c/x]S c
and t ′′[c′′/x′′]S c′′. From the definition of t ′[o′/x′], we obtain t ′[c′/x′] = t[c/x][r ′′ ← c′′]. Since t ′[o′/x′]I o ∈ PI
implies t ′[o′/x′]↓ = o, it holds that c ∈ Z(t ′[c′/x′]). From the above inductive hypothesis and Definition 23(C), we
can conclude that t ′[c′/x′]S c ∈ PS . 
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By Lemma 26, it can be easily shown that if there is I = (ν,μ) such that t[o/x] ⇒∗I t ′[o′/x′] for some o ∈ ν(c) and
o′ ∈ ν(c′), then t[c/x] ⇒∗S t ′[c′/x′]. Theorem 25 is implied by this fact.
Example 27. Consider schema S1 in Fig. 3, and let τ = office(boss(x)). We can conclude that τ is secure at Employee
since no subterm of τ [Employee/x] can be rewritten by any rule PS1,A1,Z in Fig. 9.
Example 28. We said that computer(x) is secure at Employee in the second case of Example 1. Actually, it is not
difficult to see that PS has only location(Host)S Room and office(Employee)S Room. This implies that computer(x)
is secure at Employee.
The proposed sufficient condition is obviously decidable, since the right-hand side of each rule S,A,Z is a class
and therefore the “size” of the term decreases every time a rule is applied. In what follows, we summarize the time
complexity of deciding the sufficient condition. Define the size of a term t as |Pos(t)|, i.e., the number of positions
of t . Define the description length of Σc, denoted ‖Σc‖, as the sum of the size of all t such that (m(c), t) ∈ Σc. Also,
define the size of S, denoted ‖S‖, as follows:
‖S‖ = |C| + || + |M| + |Σb| + ‖Σc‖.
Let k be the maximum arity of all the methods. The height of t is defined as the maximum length of the positions in
Pos(t). Let L and H be the maximum size and height of all t in {t | (m(c), t) ∈ Σc} ∪ {τ }, respectively. The total time
complexity (including computation of Z) is
O(kH+1L‖S‖2(|C| + 1)2kH+1+1 log‖S‖).
See Appendix A for details.
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5.1. Type inferability of linear schemas
A schema S is linear if for every composite method definition (mc(c), t) in S, t is linear. We show that linear terms
are type inferable under linear schemas, which is an improvement of the known result in [5].
Theorem 29. ES(t, c) is computable if both S and t are linear.
Proof. Let S be a linear schema. We introduce a syntactic instance IS = (νS,μS) of S as follows. Let N be a suffi-
ciently large positive integer.
(1) For each c ∈ C, define
νS(c) = {c · α | α ∈ C∗ and the length of c · α is at most N}.
Here, C∗ denotes the Kleene closure of C.
(2) For each mb ∈ Mb, define μS(mb) as follows:
(a) Suppose that Res(mb(c1, c2 . . . cn)) = c′. Then, for any oi ∈ νS(ci) (2  i  n), define μS(mb)(c1, o2,
. . . , on) = c′. Moreover, for l  1,
μS(mb)
(
c1 · c′1 · c′2 · · · c′l , o2, . . . , on
)=
{
c′1 · c′2 · · · c′l if c′1  c′,
c′ · c′2 · · · c′l otherwise.
(b) Suppose that Res(mb(c1, c2, . . . cn)) = ⊥. Then, for any oi ∈ νS(ci) (1 i  n), μS(mb)(o1, . . . , on) is unde-
fined.
The first (leftmost) symbol c of an object c · α in a syntactic instance IS represents the class of the object. For a
base method mb and objects (o1, . . . , on) ∈ νS(c1, . . . , cn), μS(mb)(o1, . . . , on) is the sequence obtained from the first
argument o1 by the following manipulation: remove the first symbol of o1 = c1 · c′1 ·α′ and if the first symbol c′1 of the
remaining sequence c′1 · α′ is not a subclass of the resolution c′ of mb at (c1, . . . , cn) then replace c′1 with c′ in order
to meet the base method definition of mb; the other arguments are simply discarded.
In what follows, we show that ES can be computed by the algorithm in [5]. See the four kinds of equations in
Section 4.2.1. Let Z be the least fixpoint of Zˆ. We already have Z(t[c/x]) ⊇ ES(t, c) by [5] for any linear term
t ∈ TM(X), and therefore, it suffices to show the opposite containment. The set of objects of a syntactic instance
contains all the sequences of classes of length less than or equal to N . Therefore, for any linear term t ∈ TM(X),
there always exist objects of a syntactic instance (with a sufficiently large N ) which exactly encode the fixpoint
computation of Z(t). In other words, for any linear term t with variables x, there always exist objects o of classes c
such that c ∈ Z(t[c/x]) implies t[o/x] →∗IS c · α, which means that t[o/x]↓IS is an object of class c. This property
can be proved by the induction on the structure of the definition of Zˆ.
• Consider Zˆ(c). We have Zˆ(c) = {c} and c · α →∗IS c · α for any α ∈ C∗.
• Consider Zˆ(mb(c)). Any c ∈ Zˆ(mb(c)) must be a subclass of Res(mb(c)). For any α ∈ C∗, let o1 = c1 · c · α and
oi = ci (2 i  n). Then, mb(o) = mb(o1, . . . , on) →IS c · α by the definition of μS .
• Suppose that c ∈ Z(mc(c)). Then, there exists t ∈ TM(X) such that Res(mc(c)) = t and c ∈ Z(t[c/x]). By the
inductive hypothesis, for any α ∈ C∗, there exists o ∈ νS(c) such that t[o/x] →∗IS c · α. Therefore, mc(o) →IS
t[o/x] →∗IS c · α.• Suppose that c ∈ Z(m(t1[c1/x1], . . . , tn[cn/xn])). Then, there exists c′ = (c′1, . . . , c′n) ∈ Z(t1[c1/x1]) × · · · ×
Z(tn[cn/xn]) such that c ∈ Z(m(c′)). By the inductive hypothesis, for any α ∈ C∗, there exists o′ = (o′1, . . . , o′n) ∈
νS(c
′) such that m(o′) →∗IS c · α. Note that by the definition of νS , o′i = c′i · α′i for some α′i ∈ C∗. By the linearity
of m(t1, . . . , tn) and the inductive hypothesis again, for every 1 i  n and for such α′ , there exists oi ∈ νS(ci )i
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c · α.
The theorem has been proved since Z(t[c/x]) is computable and ES(t, c) = Z(t[c/x]) if both S and t are linear. 
5.2. Decidability of the security of linear terms under linear schemas
The decidability of the security of linear terms under linear schemas immediately follows the next theorem since
ES is computable under linear schemas. More concretely, the sufficient condition of the security proposed in the
previous section becomes a necessary one if S and τ are linear and ES is used as Z.
Theorem 30. Let S be a linear schema and let τ be a linear term in TM(X). There is a class c′ such that
τ [c/x] ⇒∗S,A,ES c′ iff τ is insecure at c.
It suffices to prove the only if part because the if part was shown by Theorem 25. In what follows, for a linear term
t ∈ TM(X), we write ES(t, σ ) to mean ES(t, c), where t/ri = xi and σ(ri) = ci for each i.
We show that a syntactic instance IS = (νS,μS) with sufficiently large N satisfies the theorem. The outline of
the proof is as follows (see also Fig. 11). It suffices to show the soundness of the approximated inference attacks
(i.e., that ⇒∗S,A,ES implies ⇒∗IS,A) in linear case. This property can be proved by showing that S,A,ES implies IS ,A(Lemma 34) and then by lifting it to rewrite sequences (Lemma 35). For Lemma 35, we need to show that the existence
of an approximation rule in Definition 23(C) guarantees the existence of an inference rule in Definition 15(C) in a
syntactic instance. This can be done with the help of Lemma 33, which states that type information ES is closed under
term composition.
The crucial point lies in constructing a substitution mapping into IS which shows the soundness of the approxima-
tion in the proof of Lemma 34. Remember that only the first argument of a base method is used for constructing the
returned value of the method in IS . If a linear term t does not contain a composite method, it is easy to find the variable
Fig. 11. An overview of the soundness of the approximated inference attacks.
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term m1(m2(x1, x2), x3) for base methods m1 and m2, the principal position is the position of x1. For an arbitrary
linear term t , the principal position can also be found although it needs a recursive search since composite methods
may appear in t . Furthermore, we can choose objects that encode the fixpoint computation of ES (= Z in linear case)
and substitute the objects to the variables in t to construct a term that simulates ES in a syntactic instance. A mapping
that specifies these objects is called a consumed string mapping (CSM for short), and is defined in parallel with the
principal position. In the proof of Lemma 34, the substitution mapping into IS will be constructed using CSMs and
principal positions.
In what follows, CSMs and principal positions are defined. Their existence is shown in a constructive manner.
Then, the soundness of the approximated inference attacks is shown using CSMs and principal positions.
5.2.1. Definitions of CSMs and principal positions
Definition 31. Let t be a linear term in TM(X). Let σ : V (t) → C and c′ ∈ ES(t, σ ). A consumed string mapping
(CSM for short) of (t, σ, c′) is a mapping β :V (t) → C+ satisfying the following conditions:
(1) The first (leftmost) symbol of β(r) is σ(r) for each r ∈ V (t); and
(2) There is a position ξ ∈ V (t), called the principal position of (t, β), such that
(a) the last (rightmost) symbol of β(ξ) is c′, and
(b) for any mapping θβ : V (t) → OIS such that θβ(r) = β(r) · αr , where αr ∈ C∗, we have tθβ →∗IS c′ · αξ .
Here, C+ denotes the positive Kleene closure of C. See also Fig. 12.
Example 32. Consider a schema S = (C,,M,Σb,Σc) with
Mb =
{(
mb(c1, c2), c3
)
,
(
m′b(c3), c4
)}
,
Mc =
{(
mc(c1, c2),mb(x2, x1)
)}
.
Let t = m′b(mb(x1, x2)). Let σ :V (t) → C be a substitution such that σ(1 · 1) = c1 and σ(1 · 2) = c2 (hence tσ =
m′b(mb(c1, c2))). Then, β :V (t) → C+ with β(1 · 1) = c1 · c3 · c4 and β(1 · 2) = c2 is a CSM of (t, σ, c4) and 1 · 1 is
the principal position of (t, β) because for any α1·1, α1·2 ∈ C∗,
m′b
(
mb(c1 · c3 · c4 · α1·1, c2 · α1·2)
)→IS m′b(c3 · c4 · α1·1) →IS c4 · α1·1.
Fig. 12. A CSM β of (t, σ, c′) and the principal position ξ of (t, β).
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For another example, let t ′ = mc(x1, x2). Let σ ′ : V (t ′) → C be a substitution such that σ ′(1) = c2 and σ ′(2) = c1.
Then, β ′ :V (t ′) → C+ with β ′(1) = c2 and β ′(2) = c1 · c3 is a CSM of (t ′, σ ′, c3) and 2 is the principal position
of (t ′, β ′) because for any α1, α2 ∈ C∗,
mc(c2 · α1, c1 · c3 · α2) →IS mb(c1 · c3 · α2, c2 · α1) →IS c3 · α2.
Note that c′ ∈ ES(t, σ ) = ES(t, c), one of the preconditions in Definition 31, is equivalent to c′ ∈ Z(t[c/x]) by
Theorem 29. Thus, c′ ∈ ES(t, σ ) means that fixpoint computation of t[c/x] derives c′. By Theorem 29, this compu-
tation can be simulated by a syntactic instance IS . For a CSM mapping β and a variable position r in t , β(r) denotes
the prefix of an object (i.e., a sequence of class names) substituted at r which is consumed during the execution of t
to simulate the fixpoint computation.
5.2.2. Existence of CSMs and principal positions
In this section, we will effectively show the existence of a CSM β of (t, σ, c′) and the principal position of (t, β). If
t consists of only base methods, the story is easy to follow. By the definition of syntactic instances, each base method
consumes the first symbol of its first argument. A CSM can be constructed by concatenating such consumed symbols.
However, t may contain recursively-defined composite methods, and therefore, we cannot use the induction on the
structure of t . Instead, we use the induction on the execution length. Since c′ ∈ ES(t, σ ), there must be a mapping
θ :V (t) → OIS such that tθ →∗IS o′ ∈ νS(c′) and θ(r) ∈ νS(σ (r)) for each r ∈ V (t). The following proof is based on
the induction on the execution length of tθ →∗IS o′.
Basis. Consider the zero-length reduction xθ = o′ ∈ νS(c′). Then, a mapping β such that β(ε) = c′ is a CSM
of (x, σ, c′). Also, ε is the principal position of (x,β).
Induction. Consider a reduction tθ →IS t ′θ ′ →∗IS o′ ∈ νS(c′), where θ ′ :V (t ′) → OIS . Let σ ′ :V (t ′) → C be the
mapping such that θ ′(r ′) ∈ νS(σ ′(r ′)) for each r ′ ∈ V (t ′). Also, let q ∈ Pos(t) be the position contracted in the first
step of this reduction, and let m(x′′) = t/q . Assume inductively that β ′ :V (t ′) → C+ is a CSM of (t ′, σ ′, c′) and
ξ ′ ∈ V (t ′) is the principal position of (t ′, β ′).
(i) Suppose that m is a base method. Then, the following β is a CSM of (t, σ, c′) (see also Fig. 13):
β(r) =
⎧⎨
⎩
σ(r) · β ′(q) if r = q · 1,
σ (r) if r = q · i and i 	= 1,
β ′(r) otherwise.
The principal position ξ of (t, β) is as follows:
ξ =
{
ξ ′ · 1 if ξ ′ = q,
ξ ′ otherwise.
(ii) Suppose that m is a composite method. Let r ′′i denote the position of x′′i ∈ x′′ in Res(tσ/q) (note that tσ/q is in
the form of m(c)). Then, the following β is a CSM of (t, σ, c′) (see also Fig. 14):
β(r) =
{
β ′(q · r ′′i ) if r = q · i,
β ′(r) otherwise.
The principal position ξ of (t, β) is as follows:
ξ =
{
q · i if ξ ′ = q · r ′′i ,
ξ ′ otherwise.
We must show that β and ξ constructed above are indeed a CSM and the principal position. The basis can be
verified easily. For the induction case, consider a reduction tθ →IS t ′θ ′ →∗IS o′ ∈ νS(c′).
(i) Suppose that m is a base method. By the construction, the first symbol of β(q · i) is σ(q · i). Moreover, for any
r ∈ V (t) − {q · i | 1  i  n}, the first symbol of β(r) is equal to that of β ′(r), and it is σ ′(r) by the inductive
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hypothesis. tθ/r must be equal to t ′θ ′/r , and therefore, σ ′(r) = σ(r). Hence, the condition (1) in Definition 31
holds.
For the condition (2a), there are two cases to be considered. Suppose that q = ξ ′. Since ξ = ξ ′ · 1 = q · 1, the
last symbol of β(ξ) is that of σ(ξ) · β ′(ξ ′), and therefore, it is c′ by the inductive hypothesis. On the other hand,
suppose that q 	= ξ ′. Since ξ = ξ ′, the last symbol of β(ξ) is that of β ′(ξ ′), and therefore, it is c′ again by the
inductive hypothesis. Thus the condition (2a) holds.
Let θβ : V (t) → OIS be an arbitrary mapping such that θβ(r) = β(r) · αr , where αr ∈ C∗. Let θβ ′ : V (t ′) → OIS
be a mapping such that
θβ ′(r) =
{
β ′(r) · αξ if r = q,
β ′(r) · αr otherwise.
Then, tθβ →IS t ′θβ ′ by the definitions of method execution, and t ′θβ ′ →∗IS c′ · αξ by the inductive hypothesis.
Thus the condition (2b) holds.
(ii) Suppose that m is a composite method. The first symbol of β(q · i) is equal to that of β ′(q · r ′′i ), and it is
σ ′(q · r ′′i ) by the inductive hypothesis. By the definition of r ′′i , tθ/q · i is equal to t ′θ ′/q · r ′′i , and therefore,
σ ′(q · r ′′i ) = σ(q · i). Moreover, for any r ∈ V (t) − {q · i | 1  i  n}, the first symbol of β(r) is equal to that
of β ′(r), and it is σ ′(r) by the inductive hypothesis. tθ/r is equal to t ′θ ′/r , and therefore, σ ′(r) = σ(r). Hence,
the condition (1) in Definition 31 holds.
For the condition (2a), there are two cases to be considered. Suppose that q is a prefix of ξ ′. Then, there must be
j such that q · r ′′j = ξ ′, and therefore, ξ = q · j . Hence the last symbol of β(ξ) is that of β ′(ξ ′), and it is c′ by
the inductive hypothesis. On the other hand, suppose that q is not a prefix of ξ ′. Then, ξ = ξ ′ by the construction.
The last symbol of β(ξ) is that of β ′(ξ ′), and it is c′ by the inductive hypothesis. Thus the condition (2a) holds.
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Let θβ :V (t) → OIS be an arbitrary mapping such that θβ(r) = β(r) · αr , where αr ∈ C∗. Let θβ ′ :V (t ′) → OIS
be a mapping such that
θβ ′(r) =
{
β ′(r) · αq·i if r = q · r ′′i ,
β ′(r) · αr otherwise.
Then, tθβ →IS t ′θβ ′ by the definitions of method execution, and t ′θβ ′ →∗IS c′ · αξ by the inductive hypothesis.
Thus the condition (2b) holds.
5.2.3. Soundness of the approximated inference attacks
The following lemma states that ES is closed under term composition. This property is needed for showing that
existence of an approximation rule in Definition 23(C) implies the existence of an attacker’s inference rule in Defini-
tion 15(C), in the proof of Lemma 34.
Lemma 33. Let t , t ′, and t ′′ be linear terms in TM(X) such that t = t ′[q ← t ′′] for some q ∈ V (t ′). Let σ :V (t) → C,
σ ′ :V (t ′) → C and σ ′′ :V (t ′′) → C be mappings such that for some c′′ ∈ C,
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σ ′(r) =
{
c′′ if r = q,
σ (r) otherwise,
σ ′′(r ′′) = σ(q · r ′′).
Now, suppose that c′ ∈ ES(t ′, σ ′) and c′′ ∈ ES(t ′′, σ ′′). Then, c′ ∈ ES(t, σ ) (see also Fig. 15).
Proof. Let β ′ :V (t ′) → C+ and β ′′ :V (t ′′) → C+ be arbitrary CSMs of (t ′, σ ′, c′) and (t ′′, σ ′′, c′′), respectively.
Define θ : V (t) → OIS as
θ(r) =
{
β ′′(r ′′) · γ ′q if r = q · r ′′,
β ′(r) otherwise,
where γ ′q is the string obtained from β ′(q) by removing its first symbol. Also, let θ ′′ :V (t ′′) → OIS be a mapping
such that θ ′′(r ′′) = β ′′(r ′′) · γ ′q for all r ′′ ∈ V (t ′′). Then, t ′′θ ′′ →∗IS c′′ · γ ′q = β ′(q), and therefore, tθ →∗IS t ′θ ′ →∗IS c′.
Thus, we have c′ ∈ ES(t, σ ). 
The next lemma states that if tσ S,A,ES c′ exists, then under IS the corresponding inference rule for an attacker
exists. The lemma is shown by constructing a substitution mapping which shows the soundness of the approximation
using CSMs and principal positions.
Lemma 34. Let t be a linear term in TM(X) and let σ be a mapping from V (t) to C. If tσ S c′ ∈ PS , then for any
mapping θ : V (t) → OIS such that θ(r) ∈ νS(σ (r)) for each r ∈ V (t) and tθ →∗IS o′ ∈ νS(c′), we have tθIS o′ ∈ PIS .
Proof. The lemma is shown by induction on the structure of the definition of S (see Definition 23).
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assigns an object oi ∈ νS(ci) to each xi . Suppose that m(x)θ →∗IS o′ ∈ νS(c′). Since m(c) ∈ A, we have m(x)θ IS o′
by Definition 15(A). The case of Definition 23(B) is similarly proved.
Induction. Let t , t ′, and t ′′ be linear terms in TM(X) such that t = t ′[q ← t ′′] for some q ∈ V (t ′). Let σ :V (t) → C,
σ ′ :V (t ′) → C and σ ′′ :V (t ′′) → C be mappings such that for some c′′ ∈ C,
σ ′(r) =
{
c′′ if r = q,
σ (r) otherwise,
σ ′′(r ′′) = σ(q · r ′′).
Note that this is the same setting of Lemma 33 (see also Fig. 15). Now suppose that t ′σ ′ S c′ is obtained by Defini-
tion 23(C) with
• tσ S c ∈ PS for some c ∈ C;
• t ′′σ ′′ S c′′ ∈ PS ; and
• c′ ∈ ES(t ′, σ ′).
Since t ′′σ ′′ S c′′ ∈ PS , c′′ must be in ES(t ′′, σ ′′) by Definition 23. By Lemma 33, c′ ∈ ES(t, σ ). Then, by Defini-
tion 23 again, tσ S c′ must be in PS before t ′σ ′ S c′ is obtained.
Let θ ′ :V (t ′) → OIS be an arbitrary mapping such that θ ′(r) ∈ νS(σ ′(r)) for each r ∈ V (t ′) and t ′θ ′ →∗IS o′ ∈
νS(c
′). We will prove that t ′θ ′ IS o′ is in PIS , using the inductive hypothesis on t ′′σ ′′ S c′′ and tσ S c′. Let
β ′′ :V (t ′′) → C+ be a CSM of (t ′′, σ ′′, c′′). Define θ :V (t) → OIS as
θ(r) =
{
β ′′(r ′′) · γ ′q if r = q · r ′′,
θ ′(r) otherwise,
where γ ′q is the string obtained from θ ′(q) by removing its first symbol. Also, let θ ′′ :V (t ′′) → OIS be a mapping such
that θ ′′(r ′′) = β ′′(r ′′) · γ ′q for all r ′′ ∈ V (t ′′). Note that θ(r) ∈ νS(σ (r)) for each r ∈ V (t) and θ ′′(r ′′) ∈ νS(σ ′′(r ′′)) for
each r ′′ ∈ V (t ′′). Then, t ′′θ ′′ →∗IS c′′ · γ ′q = θ ′(q) ∈ νS(c′′), and therefore, tθ →∗IS t ′θ ′ →∗IS o′ ∈ νS(c′). Thus, by the
inductive hypothesis, tθ IS o′ and t ′′θ ′′ IS θ ′(q) are in PIS . Hence, by Definition 15(C), t ′θ ′ IS o′ is in PIS . 
Lastly, as stated in the lemma below, Lemma 34 can be lifted to rewrite sequences. Then, the only if part of
Theorem 30 can be derived immediately.
Lemma 35. Let t be a linear term in TM(X) and let σ be a mapping from V (t) to C. If tσ ⇒∗S c′, then there is a
mapping θ :V (t) → OIS such that tθ ⇒∗IS c′.
Proof. The lemma is shown by induction on the length of tσ ⇒∗S c′.
Basis. The lemma obviously holds if tσ = c′.
Induction. Consider a reduction tσ ⇒S t ′σ ′ ⇒∗S c′, where σ ′ :V (t ′) → C. Let q be the position at which the
subterm of tσ is rewritten in the first step of the reduction (i.e., t ′ can be written as t[q ← x′] for some variable x′).
σ ′ must satisfy
σ ′(r) =
{
c′′ if r = q,
σ (r) otherwise,
for some c′′ ∈ C. Let t ′′ = t/q and define σ ′′ :V (t ′′) → C as
σ ′′(r ′′) = σ(q · r ′′).
Then, t ′′σ ′′ S c′′ must be in PS . By Definition 23, c′′ must be in ES(t ′′, σ ′′), and therefore, there is a CSM
β ′′ :V (t ′′) → C+ of (t ′′, σ ′′, c′′). By applying Lemma 34 to β ′′, we have t ′′β ′′ IS c′′ ∈ PIS . On the other hand,
by the inductive hypothesis, there is a mapping θ ′ :V (t ′) → OI such that t ′θ ′ ⇒∗ c′ since t ′σ ′ ⇒∗ c′.S IS S
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θ(r) =
{
β ′′(r ′′) · γ ′q if r = q · r ′′,
θ ′(r) otherwise,
where γ ′q is the string obtained from θ ′(q) by removing its first symbol. Also, let θ ′′ :V (t ′′) → OIS be a mapping
such that θ ′′(r ′′) = β ′′(r ′′) · γ ′q for all r ′′ ∈ V (t ′′). Then, tθ ⇒IS t ′θ ′ using t ′′θ ′′ IS c′′ · γ ′q in PIS . Thus, we have
tθ ⇒∗IS c′. 
6. Incomparability of type inferability and security decidability
For general terms and schemas, type inference is impossible and the security is undecidable. On the other hand,
for linear terms and schemas, type inference is possible and the security is decidable. A natural question is whether
the undecidability of the security stems only from the impossibility of type inference. In this section, we provide a
negative answer to this question.
Theorem 36. The security of a non-linear term τ at c under a schema S is undecidable even if S is linear and ES(τ, c)
is computable.
Proof. Consider the reduction from the MPCP to the security problem stated in Section 4.1. Let τ = post(isw(x),
isu(x)). Since Sw,u is linear, it suffices to show that ESw,u(τ, c1) = {cdummy} for any (w,u).
Consider a pair (I, o1) such that the string represented by (I, o1) is empty. For any (w,u), such (I, o1) exists and
under such I , both isw(o1) and isu(o1) are terminating. Since post always returns an object of class cdummy, we have
ESw,u(τ, c1) = {cdummy}. 
Note that Theorems 30 and 36 show a tight bound of the decidability of the security problem. That is, the non-
linearity of only τ makes the problem undecidable.
In order for the security to be decidable, type inference of tuples of terms seems necessary. The essence of the
reduction stated in Section 4.1 is whether for some pair (I, o1), both isw(o1) and isu(o1) return objects of the same
class cok under I . Thus, the results of “separated” type inference, i.e., ESw,u(isw(x), c1) and ESw,u(isu(x), c1), are
insufficient. However, it is open whether type inference of tuples of terms is sufficient for the security to be decidable.
A natural next question may be whether the security problem is more difficult than type inference. We provide a
negative answer again.
Theorem 37. ES(τ, c) is uncomputable even if S is linear and the security of τ at c is decidable.
Proof. Consider again Sw,u and A defined in Section 4.1. Modify the definition of post so that post(o, o′) returns an
object of class cok if both o and o′ are objects of cok, and it returns an object of class cdummy otherwise. Also, add
to A the rights of post on any class. Then, the security of τ = post(isw(x), isu(x)) at c1 is trivially decidable (i.e., τ
is always insecure at c1) since the user can invoke post on any objects. However, ES(τ, c1) is uncomputable since
cok ∈ ES(τ, c1) if and only if (w,u) has a solution. 
The above theorem states that the security of τ may be easily decided using only A. In that case, whether τ is
secure or not is no help for type inference of τ . Thus, security decidability does not imply type inferability.
7. Conclusions
We have formalized the security problem against inference attacks on OODBs, and shown that the problem is
undecidable. Then we have proposed a decidable sufficient condition for a given query to be secure, by introducing
class-level inference (S ) which conservatively approximates object-level inference (I ). We believe that the approx-
imation is fairly tight in spite of its simple definition, since the sufficient condition becomes a necessary one when the
given schema is linear.
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equational logic because it is one of the most fundamental and powerful kind of inference. It is practically significant
that we can verify the security against such fundamental and powerful inference, although the linearity condition is
necessary.
Although type inferability and decidability of the security problem are incomparable, they still seem to be closely
related. Especially, as stated in Section 6, type inference of tuples of terms may be helpful for deciding the security
problem. One of the future works is to examine the relationship between the type inference of tuples of terms and the
decidability of the security problem.
We have assumed that a user knows the definitions of composite methods only if the methods are authorized to the
user. However, in some situations, the definitions of unauthorized methods may be open to the public or can be guessed
from the method names, etc. Weakening this assumption makes the definition of inference technically complicated,
and therefore left as a future work.
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Appendix A. Complexity analysis
The algorithm for deciding the sufficient condition stated in Theorem 25 consists of the following three steps:
(S1) Compute Z0 from S using the type inference algorithm in [5], where Z0 is the least fixpoint Z whose domain is
restricted to {m(c) | m ∈ Mn, c ∈ Cn}.
(S2) Compute PS,A,Z from S, A, and Z0.
(S3) Determine whether there exists a class c such that τ [c/x] ⇒∗S,A,Z c. If such c exists, then output “τ may be
insecure at c.” Otherwise, output “τ is secure at c.”
We analyze the time complexity of the algorithm. Define the size lt of a term t as |Pos(t)|, i.e., the number of
positions of t . Define the description length of Σc, denoted ‖Σc‖, as the sum of lt for all (m(c), t) ∈ Σc. Also, define
the size of S, denoted ‖S‖, as follows:
‖S‖ = |C| + || + |M| + |Σb| + ‖Σc‖.
For readability, we use N to mean ‖S‖. Let k be the maximum arity of all the methods. The height of t , denoted ht ,
is defined as the maximum length of the positions in Pos(t). Let L and H be the maximum size and height of all t in
{t | (m(c), t) ∈ Σc} ∪ {τ }, respectively. Note that k N and k L by definition.
First, consider (S1). The time complexity of computing Z0(m(c)) for all m ∈ Mn and c ∈ Cn is
O(kN |C|2k+1),
which is given in [5]. In this algorithm, Z0 is implemented by a table, and retrieving an element from Z0 takes
O(kN |C|k) time. In (S1), we also reconstruct Z0 by a more efficient data structure such as binomial heap [17]. The
time complexity ρZ0 of retrieving an element from or inserting an element into Z0 becomes
ρZ0 =O
(
k log
(|M| · |C|k))=O(k2 logN).
Note that ρZ0 	=O(k logN), since the keys are terms m(c) and a key comparison takesO(k) time. This reconstruction
takes
O(|M| · |C|k(kN |C|k + ρZ0))=O(kN |C|k(N |C|k + k logN))
time. Thus, the complexity of (S1) is
O(kN |C|k(N |C|k + k logN)). (A.1)
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 ← ∅
T2 compute Res(m(c)) for all m(c)
T3 for each m(c) in A
T4 add m(c) to Q
T5 if m ∈ Mc then
T6 let t be Res(m(c))
T7 add t[c/x] to Q
T8 while Q 	= ∅
T9 Q′ ← ∅
T10 for each (t, t ′) in
Qans × Q ∪ Q × Qans ∪ Q × Q
T11 if t ′ is a subterm of t at r ′ then
T12 if Z(t ′) has not been computed then
T13 compute Z(t ′) from Z0
T14 for each c′ in Z(t ′)
T15 add t[r ′ ← c′] to Q′
T16 Qans ← Qans ∪ Q, Q ←Q′
T17 output Qans as Q
Fig. 16. Procedure for computing Q.
Next, consider (S2). Define Q = {t | t S c ∈ PS}. In order to compute PS , it suffices to compute Q, since the
right-hand side of S can be computed from the left-hand side and Z.
Figure 16 shows a procedure for computing Q. Suppose that variables Qans, Q, Q′, and Z are implemented
by binomial heaps. Let ρQans denote the complexity of retrieving an element from or inserting an element into Qans.
Define ρQ , ρQ′ , and ρZ in the same way. Then,
ρQans = ρQ = ρQ′ = ρZ =O
(
L log |Q|),
where L is for a key comparison.
Before analyzing the procedure in Fig. 16 in detail, we estimate |Q|. Since it is difficult to estimate |Q| directly,
we introduce a finite set Q0 of terms which possibly appear in the left-hand side of S . Formally,
Q0 =
⋃
(m(c),t)∈Σc
Xt[c/x],
where Xt (t ∈ TM(C)) is defined as follows:
Xc = C,
Xm(t) = C ∪
{
m(t′)
∣∣ t ′i ∈ Xti}.
Intuitively, Xt is the set of all the terms obtained by replacing arbitrary subterms of t with arbitrary classes. Clearly
Q ⊆ Q0.
The size of Xt can be obtained by solving the following (in)equalities:
|Xc| = |C|,
|Xm(t)| |C| +
∏
i
|Xti |.
If k = 1, then
|Xt | (ht + 1)|C|,
and therefore,
|Q0|
∑
(m(c),t)∈Σc
|Xt[c/x]|
∑
(m(c),t)∈Σc
(ht[c/x] + 1)|C| =
∑
(m(c),t)∈Σc
lt[c/x]|C|
= ‖Σc‖ · |C|N |C|, (A.2)
Y. Ishihara et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 73 (2007) 788–817 815since lt = ht +1 if k = 1. Next, consider the case that k  2. For any nonnegative integer h, let Kh denote kh +kh−1 +
· · · + k0. In what follows, we show that
|Xt |
(|C| + 1)Kht . (A.3)
If ht = 0, then |Xt | = |C| (|C| + 1)K0 = |C| + 1. Suppose that Eq. (A.3) holds for any term t ′ such that ht ′  h for
some h 0. Consider a term t = m(t′) such that ht = h + 1. Then,
|Xt | |C| +
∏
i
|Xt ′i | |C| +
((|C| + 1)Kh)k = |C| + (|C| + 1)Kh+1−1

(|C| + 1)Kh+1 .
Therefore, Eq. (A.3) holds and
|Q0|
∑
(m(c),t)∈Σc
|Xt[c/x]|
∑
(m(c),t)∈Σc
(|C| + 1)Kht[c/x]
 ‖Σc‖
(|C| + 1)KH N(|C| + 1)KH N(|C| + 1)kH+1 , (A.4)
using KH  kH+1 if k  2. After all, from Eqs. (A.2) and (A.4), we obtain
|Q| |Q0|N
(|C| + 1)kH+1 .
Let us analyze the procedure in Fig. 16 in detail. See (T2). A straightforward algorithm can compute Res in
O(kN |C|k) (A.5)
time. Next, see (T3) through (T7). In (T3), |A| |M| · |C|k  N |C|k . If Res is implemented by an appropriate data
structure, then retrieving an element from Res takes
ρRes =O
(
k log
(|M| · |C|k))=O(k2 logN)
time in (T6). In (T7), computing t[c/x] takes O(L) time. Therefore, executing (T3) through (T7) takes
O(|A|(ρQ + log |Mc| + ρRes + L + ρQ))
=O(N |C|k(L log |Q| + k2 logN))
=O(kH+1LN |C|k logN), (A.6)
using k  L.
See (T8) through (T16). By Q and Q′, we avoid selecting a duplicated pair of t and t ′ in (T10). In other
words, (T11) through (T15) are executed at most |Q|2 times, and therefore, (T16) is also executed at most |Q|2 times.
Moreover, (T13) is executed at most |Q| times, since the condition of (T12) holds at most |Q| times.
In (T11), Knuth–Morris–Pratt string matching algorithm [17] can check in O(L) time whether t ′ is a subterm of t .
Constructing t[r ′ ← c] in (T15) takes O(L) time. Computing Qans ∪Q takes O(L log |Q|) time [17]. Therefore, the
complexity of (T11) through (T16) except (T13) is
O(|Q|2(L + ρZ + ρZ + |C|(L + ρQ′))+ |Q|2 · L log |Q|)
=O(|Q|2 · |C| · L log |Q|)
=O(kH+1LN2(|C| + 1)2kH+1+1 logN). (A.7)
On the other hand, in (T13), Z(t) is computed from Z0 as follows:
Z
(
m(c)
)= Z0(m(c)),
Z
(
m(t)
)= ⋃ Z0(m(c)).
c∈Z(t1)×···×Z(tn)
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 ← {τ [c/x]}
U2 while D 	= ∅
U3 D′ ← ∅
U4 for each (t, t ′′) in D × Q
U5 if t ′′ is a subterm of t at r ′′ then
U6 for each c′′ in Z(t ′′)
U7 add t[r ′′ ← c′′] to D′
U8 Dans ← Dans ∪ D, D ← D′
U9 if Dans contains a class then
U10 output “τ may be insecure at c”
U11 else
U12 output “τ is secure at c”
Fig. 17. Procedure for determining τ [c/x] ⇒∗
S
c.
The time complexity of computing Z(t) is
O(ρZ0 lt |C|k+1)=O(k2L|C|k+1 logN).
The total complexity of (T13) is
O(|Q| · k2L|C|k+1 logN)=O(k2LN(|C| + 1)kH+1+k+1 logN). (A.8)
Both of Eqs. (A.5) and (A.6) are bounded by Eq. (A.7). Furthermore, Eq. (A.8) is also bounded by Eq. (A.7) since
k N . Thus, the complexity of (S2) is given by Eq. (A.7).
Lastly, consider (S3). Let D = {t | τ [c/x] ⇒∗S t}. Then,
|D| |Xτ [c/x]| |Q0| =O
(
N
(|C| + 1)kH+1),
since hτ H .
Figure 17 shows a procedure for determining whether D contains a class. Suppose that Dans, D, D′ are imple-
mented by binomial heaps. By D and D′, we avoid selecting t ∈ D more than once. Therefore, (U5) through (U7)
are executed at most |D| · |Q| times. (U8) is also executed at most |D| · |Q| times. Retrieving an element from or
inserting an element into D′ takes
ρD′ =O
(
L log |D|)=O(kH+1L logN)
time. Computing D ∪ D also takes O(L log |D|) time. Thus, executing (U2) through (U8) takes
O(|D| · |Q|(L + ρZ + |C|(L + ρD′))+ |D| · |Q| · L log |D|)
=O(|D| · |Q| · |C| · L log |D|)
=O(kH+1LN2(|C| + 1)2kH+1+1 logN). (A.9)
(U9) can be checked in O(|D|) time. Therefore, the time complexity of executing (S3) is given by Eq. (A.9).
By Eqs. (A.1), (A.7), and (A.9), the time complexity of the algorithm is
O(kH+1LN2(|C| + 1)2kH+1+1 logN).
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